湖南省常德市人民政府办公室


常德市人民政府办公室关于印发《常德市志书编纂工作细则《常德市旧志整理工作细则》的通知



常政办发〔2006〕19号

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　二OO六年八月十五日

常德市志书编纂工作细则

总则

　　 第一条　坚持以马列主义、毛泽东思想、邓小平理论、“三个代表”重要思想和科学发展观为指导，坚持依法修志。

　　第二条　坚持辩证唯物主义和历史唯物主义的世界观和方法论。

　　第三条　坚持实事求是的原则。

　　第四条　维护祖国统一、民族团结和中国共产党的领导。　

　　第五条　保守国家秘密。

　　第六条　尊重、保护著作权和版权。

　　第一章体例

　　第七条　志书体裁以志体为主，力求诸体并用。同时，应具备图片（包括地图、各类示意图以及彩色、黑白照片以及手绘人物肖像图等）、序言、凡例、目录、概述、大事记、各专志、人物传、表格、附录和后记。

　　 ㈠　人物传记坚持“生不立传”的原则，同时鼓励设专章记述本区域内人物结构、人才成因、缺陷及选人标准、原则，允许采用“访谈"、“简介”、“名录”等形式对当代人物予以客观、公正记述。

　　 ㈡　图片、影像是地情资料的重要载体，应当简约净化彩色插页的图片，尽量避免带广告性质的图片入志，注重历史图片随文入志。鼓励运用现代技术手段对图、表进行艺术处理。

　　 ㈢　目录要求中英文对照，一般应编制索引，原则上要求电子版志书同步。

　　第八条　篇目体式分大、中、小篇三种，应合乎科学分类和社会分工实际，做到门类合理，归属得当。

　　第九条 篇目层次依次为篇、章、节、目，做到层次分明，排列有序。允许对地方特色突出的事物、产业、工作等作适当升格处理。

　　第十条　主张设专篇对前志进行勘误、补正和考辨，并注意录入对前志的研究成果。

　　第十一条　除新设或有重大变更的机构外，志书篇、章下一般不设小序述机构沿革、内容述要，节、目下一般不设序。

　　第二章资料

　　第十二条　征集资料一般采取“众手成志”的办法，向机关、社会团体、企事业单位、其他组织以及个人征集，但必须做到程序合法，手续完备。
对征集到的资料应合理取舍，不允许夹杂个人感情。

　　第十三条　引用重要资料应采用页末注或文尾注方式说明出处。口碑资料应有其他文字资料佐证，“孤证”不入志。

　　第十四条　资料全面，能涵盖本区域内的各项事业，做到不漏项。

　　第十五条　资料完整，能反映事物发生、发展过程，做到不断线。

　　第十六条　所有统计资料，应由政府统计工作部门提供。

　　第三章著述

　　第十七条　遵守地域界限，除与本区域事业、机构等有利害或因果关系的区域外人、事、物不记。

　　第十八条　遵守行业界限，专志应打破部门约束，全面、完整记述本项事业，横陈百科，同时应淡化部门痕迹，避免交叉重复。

　　第十九条　严格时间断限，但为全面反映改革开放的历程，大事记或有关专志可以适当上溯；下限应整齐划一，一般不下延。

　　第二十条　志书采用纪事本末体，按时间顺序纵述事物（业）的起始、发展和现状。

　　第二十一条　记述应该客观全面，既要记成绩，也要记失误，要揭示事物、事业发展和兴衰的规律，彰明因果。

　　记述改革开放初期的经验、教训和志书时间断限内的重大政治事件，以《中共简史》和中共中央有关文件、决议为依据。涉及到的相关人物，采取“宜粗不宜细”的办法进行记述。

　　第二十二条　因事系人丰富，坚持“寓论于事”，鼓励对人物、事件等进行适当、精练、中立和客观的评价。

　　第二十三条　著述篇幅市志一般不突破150万字；县（市、区）志一般不突破100万字；部门志一般不突破50万字；乡(镇)志一般不突破30万字。

　　第四章行文

　　第二十四条　志名规范。志书以现定的行政区划名称冠名，并括注断限起止年份，如“常德市志（××××——××××年）”（市级）、“市××区志”、“××县志（×××——××××年）”和“津市市志（××××——××××年）”（县级）；部门志统一称“常德市××志（××××——××××年）”或“××县××志（××××——×××年）”；乡（镇）志统一称“××区县(市)××乡（镇）志”；厂（矿）志统一称“××（矿）志（××××——××××年）”。

　　第二十五条　文体、语言得当。

　　 ㈠　志书一律用语体文、记述体，除引文外，不使用口语、文言或文白夹杂的语言。

　　 ㈡　不使用模糊概念，如“大概”、“目前”、“有人认为”、“由于种种原因”等。

　　第二十六条　名称准确。

　　 ㈠　机构名称采用第三人称，不出现“我市”、“我县”、“本局”等，须直书机构名；对各个历史阶段党派、机构、职务名称以当时名称为准。

　　 ㈡　人名一般直书姓名，不加“先生”、“同志”等称呼，但可以前冠职务。

　　 ㈢　地名以各历史阶段实际情况为准，使用古地名，应冠以朝代并括注今址，使用乡（镇）村名时应前冠县名。

　　 ㈣　各种名称（含行业术语、专业用语）第一次出现，须用全称，其后可注明用简称。

　　 ㈤　动物、植物和矿物名称一律用标准学名。

　　第二十七条　时间表述具体。

　　㈠　不用时间简称，如“05年”；不用概念时间，如：“今年”、“最近”等。

　　㈡　历史纪年，先书朝代年号，再括注公元纪年。

　　㈢　使用农历时间应冠“农历”。

　　第二十八条　数字书写标准。

　　㈠　清代以前历史纪年、不定数（如五六个）、次第（如第一名）、习惯用语（如八国联军）、成语（如七上八下）、军队番号（如第四野战军、第一一六师团）等用汉字数字。

　　㈡　民国纪年及公元纪年、记数（如10平方米、4.5倍、15%）等用阿拉伯数字。

　　㈢　1—5位数写绝对数；6—8位数可以万为单位；9位数以上可以亿为单位。

　　㈣　表示数字范围时，用波浪式连接号“”。

　　㈤　引文中的数字，一般按原版本写法书写。

　　第二十九条　计量名称遵守国家质量标准。

　　㈠　历史上使用过的计量单位，可据当时情况记载。

　　㈡　现代读者不熟悉的计量单位（如“斗”、“石”等），第一次出现时，应换算成现代计量单位括注说明。

　　㈢　行文中计量单位用汉字书写，如：m2、m记为“平方米”、“米”；公式中均用计量单位符号，如平方米、水，记为“m2”、“H2O”。

　　第三十条　志书一律使用简化汉字（历史记述如古地名、古人名、金石文等除外）；标点符号使用以《常用标点符号用法简表》为准。

　　第三十一条　引文忠于原著，一律用引号。

　　第五章出版

　　第三十二条　志书在严格履行审查验收程序后，由正规出版社出版。

　　第三十三条　采用大16开本，鼓励专门设计具有本区域历史文化底蕴的封面，不使用护封。

　　第三十四条　县（市、区）志书应采用统一的版权页格式。

　　第三十五条　志书版式一律横排。

　　第三十六条　文字字体字号和谐，一级标题用2号黑体，占6行；二级标题用3号仿宋体，占4行；三级标题用5号黑体，占1行；四级标题用5号楷体，占1行；正文用5号仿宋体。文字差错率不超过十万分之三。

　　第三十七条　装订无缺页、串页、倒页、残页。

　　第六章附则

　　第三十八条　本工作细则由常德市人民政府地方志办公室组织实施。

　　第三十九条　本工作细则适用于常德市境内所有志书编纂实务。

　　常德市旧志整理工作细则

　　第一章总则

　　 第一条　为保证常德市旧志整理点校体例统一、行文规范、进度协调、布局科学，根据中共中央《关于整理我国古籍的意见》和《新编地方志工作暂行规定》，特制定《常德市旧志整理工作细则》。

　　第二条　抢救整理与开发利用并重，将全市旧志点校保护工作纳入建设常德“文化名城”系统工程。

　　第三条　全市旧志点校按市、县两级体系分两轮实施。2000—2005年为首轮，2006—2010年为第二轮。

　　第四条本工作细则规范范畴涵盖旧志整理中的校勘、标点、注释、正音、正字、统稿、编辑和出版等方面。

　　第二章校勘

　　第五条　选择版本完好，内容翔实，具有较强研究价值的版本作为底本，如有两个以上的版本，应取其一为底本，另一种为校本。在质量悬殊不大的情况下，优先考虑孤本和稀见本。

　　第六条　校勘一般采取对校，结合理校。

　　第七条　校勘须严格依底本。

　　第八条　校勘只限于文字的脱、讹、衍、倒，不涉及底本所述史实。

　　第三章标点

　　第九条　严格按照古汉语语法断句，差错率控制在十万分之零点五以内（以底本文字计算）。

　　第十条　标点符号执行《常用标点符号用法简表》标准。

　　第十一条　并列的句式，能用逗号、句号的一般不用分号。

　　第十二条　文中典籍一律加书名号；所引典籍或说明内容出处的单句一律不标点。

　　第十三条　引文不是完整的句子，末尾不宜用句号的前面不用冒号；引文较长的，采用提行或空格形式。

　　第十四条　文中表格小字一律不与大字（人名、坊名等）接排，提行空格排列。单句不标点，内容多的用完整标点，人名是两个字的中间空一格。

　　第十五条　“按”的统一处理：直接在后面连正文的，用“按：……”；后面接书目的，用“按，《……》：……”。

　　第十六条　句中小字（典籍或说明出处的文字）后面接排大字（正文）的，一律在小字与大字间空格。

　　第十七条　年代间隔一律用“~”。

　　第十八条　原文中脱字统一用“□”标示。

　　第四章注释

　　第十九条　按“中等以上文化程度的人能够阅读”的总体要求，确定注释范围和对象，释文原则上不超过正文文字量的三分之一。

　　第二十条　注释与原文要保持高度一致，凡原本脱衍倒讹，确有实据的，补改；凡疑有脱衍倒讹而无实据的，存疑。

　　第二十一条　注释一律用现代语体文，不允许以文言注文言或文白夹杂。

　　第二十二条　注释应注意吸收相关研究成果，对原本所述史实进行考证。

　　第二十四条　注释一律用脚注，除古今年代对照外，不夹杂在原本当中。

　　第二十五条　注释角标一律放在需注内容的右上角，标号以每页为单位排序，如“《赋役全书》①”。

　　第二十六条　古代年号注释在原文后用括注，只用阿拉伯数字，不加“公元”和“年”，公元前年代在数字前加“前”。古代地名均注明现在相应的政区、方位。人物注释按出生年月、籍贯、职位、成就顺序排列。　

　　第二十七条　注义时先注本义，再注引伸义和本文义；先注句、词义，再注该句、词中单字义。

　　第二十八条　通假字注释的格式为：见（xiàn）：通“现”。对假字可视情况决定是否注释。

　　第五章正字注音

　　第二十九条　文字使用规范通用的简体字，繁体字、异体字一律转换，古有今无、有繁无简文字，严格按原本。

　　第三十　条原本明显错字，允许迳改，以“原本作×”括注。

　　第三十一　条注音使用规范的汉语拼音，加圆括号。

　　第三十二　条注音一般在生字后用括注，如词语中每一个字均需注音，则在该词语后用括注；不注义的生字注音的格式为：莅：音li；对古今异读，须加注古音，如：镡：音tán，古读xún。

　　第六条编辑统稿

　　第三十三　条旧志整理出版时名称统一某朝某年代某志校注，如“清同治安福县志校注”。

　　第三十四　条校注本编辑应完成目录编排、序言、编辑说明撰写工作。

　　第三十五　条图（风景、地形）名及图中地名与正文或目录统一，原本没有规范的，要予以规范。

　　第三十六　条浅白注释不超过万分之一（以校注本文字计）。

　　第三十七　条没有重复注释、相互注释。

　　第三十八　条文字校对认真，差错率不超过十万分之一。

　　七章出版

　　第三十九　条标题分四级，一级为书名，二、三、四级用于章、节、目名，分别用小初号、2、3、4号字，正文用5号仿宋体，注释文字用小5号楷体。

　　 第四十条　开本采用1/32，封面设计古朴、简约，能体现旧志所志区域内的文化内涵，不使用护封。

　　第四十一条　统一排版格式，横排，一般由常德市人民政府地方志办公室指定印刷厂印刷。

　　第四十二条　使用正规书号公开出版，精装本，有条件的可同时出版影印本；特别珍贵的稀本，应该出版线装影印本。



Chapter V
Guidelines for Interpretation
of the WTO Covered Agreements


OUTLINE

I Introduction
II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
IV The Status of Legitimate Expectations in Interpretation



I Introduction
According to Art. 11 of the DSU, the panel's role is to “make an objective assessment of the matter before it, including an objective assessment of the facts of the case and the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. In the previous chapter, we have examined the general standard of review labeled as “an objective assessment” regarding “the facts of the case”; clearly, for panels to fulfil appropriately their functions as designated in Art. 11 of the DSU, it is also indiscerptible to make such an objective assessment of “the applicability and conformity with the relevant covered agreements”. Therefore, the interpretation issue of the covered agreements arises. In this section, the author will scrutinize guidelines for interpretation applied under the WTO jurisprudence.
To resolve a particular dispute, before addressing the parties' arguments in detail, it is clearly necessary and appropriate to clarify the general issues concerning the interpretation of the relevant provisions and their application to the parties' claims. However, the complex nature of the covered agreements has given rise to difficulties in interpretation.
As noted previously, GATT/WTO jurisprudence should not be viewed in isolation from general principles developed in international law or most jurisdictions; and according to Art. 3.2 of the DSU, panels are bound by the “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” in their examination of the covered agreements. A number of recent adopted reports have repeatedly referred, as interpretative guidelines, to “customary rules of interpretation of public international law” as embodied in the text of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (‘Vienna Convention’), especially in its Arts. 31, 32. It is in accordance with these rules of treaty interpretation that panels or the Appellate Body have frequently examined the WTO provisions at issue, on the basis of the ordinary meaning of the terms of those provisions in their context, in the light of the object and purpose of the covered agreements and the WTO Agreement. These Vienna Convention articles provide as follows:

“Art. 31: General Rule of Interpretation
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes:
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty;
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connexion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty.
3. There shall be taken into account together with the context:
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions;
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation;
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.

Art. 32 Supplementary Means of Interpretation
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31:
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.”

II Application of Arts. 31, 32 of the Vienna Convention
Pursuant to Art. 31.1 of the Vienna Convention, the duty of a treaty interpreter is to determine the meaning of a term in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the term in its context and in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. As noted by the Appellate Body in its Report on Japan-Alcoholic Beverages (DS8/DS10/DS11), “Article 31 of provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: ‘interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty’. The provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions”. And in US ? Shrimps (DS58), the Appellate Body accordingly states: “A treaty interpreter must begin with, and focus upon, the text of the particular provision to be interpreted. It is in the words constituting that provision, read in their context, that the object and purpose of the states parties to the treaty must first be sought. Where the meaning imparted by the text itself is equivocal or inconclusive, or where confirmation of the correctness of the reading of the text itself is desired, light from the object and purpose of the treaty as a whole may usefully be sought.”
More specifically, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules that: “Text, context and object-and-purpose correspond to well established textual, systemic and teleological methodologies of treaty interpretation, all of which typically come into play when interpreting complex provisions in multilateral treaties. For pragmatic reasons the normal usage, and we will follow this usage, is to start the interpretation from the ordinary meaning of the ‘raw’ text of the relevant treaty provisions and then seek to construe it in its context and in the light of the treaty's object and purpose. However, the elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object-and-purpose as well as good faith - are to be viewed as one holistic rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Context and object-and-purpose may often appear simply to confirm an interpretation seemingly derived from the ‘raw’ text. In reality it is always some context, even if unstated, that determines which meaning is to be taken as ‘ordinary’ and frequently it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at object-and-purpose. As noted by the Appellate Body: ‘Article 31 of the Vienna Convention provides that the words of the treaty form the foundation for the interpretive process: 'interpretation must be based above all upon the text of the treaty'’. It adds, however, that ‘[t]he provisions of the treaty are to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. The object and purpose of the treaty are also to be taken into account in determining the meaning of its provisions’.” 1
In sum, as noted by the Panel in Canada-Automotive Industry (DS139/DS142), “understanding of these rules of interpretation is that, even though the text of a term is the starting-point for any interpretation, the meaning of a term cannot be found exclusively in that text; in seeking the meaning of a term, we also have to take account of its context and to consider the text of the term in light of the object and purpose of the treaty. Article 31 of the Vienna Convention explicitly refers to the ‘ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their [the terms'] context and in the light of its [the treaty's] object and purpose’. The three elements referred to in Article 31 - text, context and object and purpose - are to be viewed as one integrated rule of interpretation rather than a sequence of separate tests to be applied in a hierarchical order. Of course, context and object and purpose may simply confirm the textual meaning of a term. In many cases, however, it is impossible to give meaning, even ‘ordinary meaning’, without looking also at the context and/or object and purpose”. 2
With regard to Art. 32 of the Vienna Convention, it is repeatedly ruled that, “[t]he application of these rules in Article 31 of the Vienna Convention will usually allow a treaty interpreter to establish the meaning of a term. However, if after applying Article 31 the meaning of the term remains ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, Article 32 allows a treaty interpreter to have recourse to ‘... supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion’. With regard to 'the circumstances of [the] conclusion' of a treaty, this permits, in appropriate cases, the examination of the historical background against which the treaty was negotiated.” 3
As a whole, under the WTO jurisprudence, with regard to the dispute among the parties over the appropriate legal analysis to be applied, as general principles or guidelines of interpretation, it is often begun with Art. 3.2 of the DSU. To go further, as noted by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverages, “the ‘customary rules of interpretation of public international law’ are those incorporated in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT). GATT panels have previously interpreted the GATT in accordance with the VCLT. The Panel noted that Article 3:2 DSU in fact codifies this previously-established practice”. Consequently, “the Panel concluded that the starting point of an interpretation of an international treaty, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, in accordance with Article 31 VCLT, is the wording of the treaty. The wording should be interpreted in its context and in the light of the object and the purpose of the treaty as a whole and subsequent practice and agreements should be taken into account. Recourse to supplementary means of interpretation should be made exceptionally only under the conditions specified in Article 32 VCLT”. 4
In short, it is may be the case that, it is generally considered that the fundamental rules of treaty interpretation set out in Arts. 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention have attained the status of rules of customary international law. In recent years, the jurisprudence of the Appellate Body and WTO panels has become one of the richest sources from which to receive guidance on their application.
III WTO Rules on Conflicts: Effective Interpretation
The Panel Report on Turkey-Textile and Clothing Products (DS34) states concerning the conflicts issue that: 5
“As a general principle, WTO obligations are cumulative and Members must comply with all of them at all times unless there is a formal ‘conflict’ between them. This flows from the fact that the WTO Agreement is a ‘Single Undertaking’. On the definition of conflict, it should be noted that: ‘… a conflict of law-making treaties arises only where simultaneous compliance with the obligations of different instruments is impossible. ... There is no conflict if the obligations of one instrument are stricter than, but not incompatible with, those of another, or if it is possible to comply with the obligations of one instrument by refraining from exercising a privilege or discretion accorded by another’.
This principle, also referred to by Japan in its third party submission, is in conformity with the public international law presumption against conflicts which was applied by the Appellate Body in Canada - Periodicals and in EC - Bananas III, when dealing with potential overlapping coverage of GATT 1994 and GATS, and by the panel in Indonesia - Autos, in respect of the provisions of Article III of GATT, the TRIMs Agreement and the SCM Agreement. In Guatemala - Cement, the Appellate Body when discussing the possibility of conflicts between the provisions of the Anti-dumping Agreement and the DSU, stated: ‘A special or additional provision should only be found to prevail over a provision of the DSU in a situation where adherence to the one provision will lead to a violation of the other provision, that is, in the case of a conflict between them’.
We recall the Panel's finding in Indonesia - Autos, a dispute where Indonesia was arguing that the measures under examination were subsidies and therefore the SCM Agreement being lex specialis, was the only ‘applicable law’ (to the exclusion of other WTO provisions): ‘14.28 In considering Indonesia's defence that there is a general conflict between the provisions of the SCM Agreement and those of Article III of GATT, and consequently that the SCM Agreement is the only applicable law, we recall first that in public international law there is a presumption against conflict. This presumption is especially relevant in the WTO context since all WTO agreements, including GATT 1994 which was modified by Understandings when judged necessary, were negotiated at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum. In this context we recall the principle of effective interpretation pursuant to which all provisions of a treaty (and in the WTO system all agreements) must be given meaning, using the ordinary meaning of words.’
In light of this general principle, we will consider whether Article XXIV authorizes measures which Articles XI and XIII of GATT and Article 2.4 of the ATC otherwise prohibit. In view of the presumption against conflicts, as recognized by panels and the Appellate Body, we bear in mind that to the extent possible, any interpretation of these provisions that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided.”
It is clearly implied by the ruling above that, in the WTO system, any interpretation of the covered agreements that would lead to a conflict between them should be avoided. In this respect, as to WTO rules of conflicts, in the context that all WTO agreements were negotiated “at the same time, by the same Members and in the same forum”, the principle of effective interpretation is recalled. What a principle is it?
As ruled by the Panel in Japan-Alcoholic Beverage (DS8/DS10/DS11), effective interpretation is a principle “whereby all provisions of a treaty must be, to the extent possible, given their full meaning so that parties to such a treaty can enforce their rights and obligations effectively…. this principle of interpretation prevents [the panel] from reaching a conclusion on the claims … or the defense …, or on the related provisions invoked by the parties, that would lead to a denial of either party's rights or obligations.” 6 This ruling is upheld by the Appellate Body when ruling that, “[a] fundamental tenet of treaty interpretation flowing from the general rule of interpretation set out in Article 31 is the principle of effectiveness (ut res magis valeat quam pereat). In United States - Standards for Reformulated and Conventional Gasoline, we noted that ‘[o]ne of the corollaries of the ‘general rule of interpretation’ in the Vienna Convention is that interpretation must give meaning and effect to all the terms of the treaty. An interpreter is not free to adopt a reading that would result in reducing whole clauses or paragraphs of a treaty to redundancy or inutility’.” 7